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Abstract 
During the last two decades, profound changes in the international division of labour among firms have 
occurred,  with  impressive  growth  in  outsourcing,  off-shoring  of  some  stages  of  production  and  the 
globalization of intermediates goods markets. This new model of the international division of labour has 
both initiated an increasing variety of relationships among producers and spurred the development of 
Global Value Chains. According to some recent research, Global Value Chains have been one of the main 
transmission  mechanisms  of  the  Great  Trade  Collapse  that  severely  and  simultaneously  hit  all  OECD 
countries in 2009.  
Pervasive as it has been, it also appears that the impact of the crisis on firms involved in Global Value 
Chains has been highly heterogeneous. Our paper intends to contribute to this very recent and ongoing 
debate,  providing  a  description  of  the  effects  of  the  crisis  from  a  perspective  that  is  both  country-
comparative, Germany and Italy being the countries taken into consideration, and on firm level, as we pay 
particular attention to the positioning of the firms along Global Value Chains, i.e., whether intermediate or 
final firms- and to their strategies. Three are the main conclusions: i) intermediate firms were hit by the 
crisis more than final firms; ii) among intermediate firms, the ones that carried out innovation activities in 
the previous period (before 2008) were somewhat sheltered by the effect of crisis; iii) firms’ positioning in 
GVCs and their strategies may help to explain the Italy-Germany performance gap. 
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1.  Introduction 
A growing body of literature over the past twenty years considers that a structural change 
in the productive economy has occurred as a further consequence of the ICT revolution, 
the  steady  lowering  of  trade  barriers  and  transport  costs  (Feenstra,  1998),  and  the 
changing nature of multinational enterprises (Saliola and Zanfei, 2009). The outcome is a 
new  international  division  of  labour  in  which  the  production  of  final  products  is 
fragmented in Global Value Chains (GVCs henceforth). Under this interpretation, one may 
consider the production process for any given good as a continuum of tasks assigned to 
the various productive units; these tasks can be performed in several different places 
around  the  world.  The  organization  of  production  varies  continually,  with  each  task 
offshored to the country where the production and international transaction costs are 
lowest.    According  to  Miroudot  and  Ragoussis  (2009),  trade  in  intermediate  inputs 
represents a share of between 56% and 73% of overall trade flows in goods and services 
for developed economies. 
In the face of the 2008-09 great recession, the systemic importance of GVC proved to be 
significant.  According  to  several  studies,  GVCs  acted  as  a  channel  for  the  rapid 
transmission  of  real  and  financial  shocks,  thus  amplifying  the  national  fluctuations  of 
demand for final goods. Baldwin (2009) holds that the synchrony of the collapse in world 
trade  was  precisely  caused  by  the  input-output  linkages  in  GVCs.  Moreover,  recent 
research shows that the impact of the crisis on firms’ performance is sensibly different 
according to the organizational mode of global transactions (Altomonte et al., 2012) as 
well as by firms’ positioning in the GVCs (whether outsourcer or intermediate, Bekes et 
al., 2011). 
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  contribute  to  this  recent  debate  by  analyzing  the 
microeconomic organizational characteristics and performances of firms involved in GVCs 
using the EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit survey (henceforth Efige). We first make an account   3 
of  the  differences  between  final  and  intermediate  firms in  terms  of  numerosity,  size, 
productivity  and  dynamics in  sales  during  the  2008-09  crisis.  We  then  use a  principal 
components  analysis  with  the  aim  to  detect  firms’  strategies  in  terms  of 
internationalization,  innovation  and  human  capital  accumulation.  Then,  in  the 
econometric part of the paper, we compare the dynamics of sales during the 2008-09 
crisis  by  distinguishing  between  intermediate  and  final  firms  and,  within  each  group, 
according to the company’s strategies.  
We exploit the cross-national nature of the Efige dataset by comparing German and Italian 
industrial firms, paying particular attention to their positioning in GVCs. Germany and Italy 
are somewhat paradigmatic countries and provide to be an interesting area of application 
as:  i)  they  are  both  highly  industrialized  countries  and  leaders  in  EU  manufacturing 
exports; ii) industrial firms of both countries are substantially involved in and affected by 
globalization; iii) a large share of firms (higher in the Italian industry) work exclusively as 
intermediate firms , a key factor in our analyses to explain heterogeneous resilience to the 
crisis.  
The 2008-09 crisis is a particularly interesting case for many reasons. First, it was quite 
unexpected and originated from the US financial crisis of the summer of 2007. This implies 
that  it  can  be  considered  exogenous  to  the  German  and  Italian  economic  conditions. 
Second,  the  downturn  was  particularly  severe.  German  and  Italian  GDP  fell  by, 
respectively, 4 and 7 per cent in two year; the crisis can be considered as a serious “stress 
test” for firm’s strategic decisions. Third, as pointed out before (Baldwin, 2009; Altomonte 
et al., 2012), GVCs had a primary role in transmitting the crisis worldwide; this implies that 
firms’ involvement in the crisis can be considered first rate.  
Our results show that intermediate firms are on average smaller, less productive than final 
firms.  Their  strategies  are  also  somewhat  less  ambitious  in  terms  of  human  capital 
accumulation, innovation and internationalization. The econometric part shows that being   4 
an intermediate firm is generally associated with a more severe contraction of sales during 
the  2008-09  crisis.  However,  heterogeneity  among  firms  matters.  The  contraction  of 
turnover for firms with high human capital was smaller; innovative intermediate firms also 
experienced a slighter reduction.  
All in all, the positioning within the GVC and their strategies explains a relevant portion of 
the difference in performance between German and Italian firms.  
A methodological disclaimer is worth making. This is basically a descriptive paper that 
aims at establishing some stylized facts on the microeconomics of GVCs; this implies that, 
in  regression  analyses,  we  cannot  make  any  serious  claim  of  causality  between  firm 
organizational characteristics (e.g. intermediate vs. final) and their performance during 
the crisis due to the presence of serious endogeneity problems (self-selection into the 
“intermediate” group or omitted variable biases). Keeping this in mind, we deem to make 
a relevant step forward in the growing body of empirical literature on GVCs (that we 
review in the next section) under three main aspects. First, we make a  cross-country 
analysis for two developed and highly industrialized economies; this is an important issue 
since most of the existing literature focuses on emerging markets firms and their chances 
to access GVCs. Second, unlike developing countries in which intermediate firms prevail, 
advanced economies are characterized by the coexistence of both final and intermediate 
firms; this implies that they are on  the verge to become either a “headquarter” or  a 
“factory  economy”  (Baldwin,  2011).  By  analyzing  firm  performance  during  a  great 
economic shock, we are able to understand which is the “best” specialization of a country 
under “extreme” economic conditions. Third, as heterogeneity matters, the analysis of the 
micro dynamics at firm level is particularly relevant in terms of strategies and their ability 
to face a major macroeconomic shock.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Sections 2.1 reviews the most relevant theoretical 
and applied literature concerning behavior and performance of firms involved in GVCs,   5 
while  Section  2.1  makes  a  comparison  between  Italy  and  Germany  in  terms  of 
involvement in GVCs; Section 2.3 analyzes the very recent debate on the role of GVCs as 
transmission  mechanisms  of  the  2008-9  financial  crisis.  Section  3  presents  the  data. 
Section  4.1  shows  some  descriptive  statistics  in  terms  of  participation  to  GVCs  and 
performance;  while  Section  4.2  presents  the  principal  component  analysis  to  detect 
heterogeneous strategies among firms. Section 5 analyzes the performance of the firms 
during the crisis by setting up the estimation methods and presenting the main results. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Firms in the GVCs 
 
2.1 A brief literature review  
 
Organization and performance of firms involved in GVCs have been under scrutiny by two 
very different streams of literature. To the first one, based on the theory of the firm, 
belong the models by Melitz (2003); Antras and Helpman (2004); Helpman et al. (2004); 
Helpman (2006). They have analyzed which sourcing strategy (i.e., the “make-or-buy” and 
“where-to-make-or-buy” organizational choices) firms choose in order to internationally 
organize their production. Based on the hypothesis of firms’ heterogeneity, this stream of 
literature links firms’ organizational choices with the various forms of internationalization. 
The main predictions (Antras and Helpman, 2004) are that  there exists a productivity 
ordering such that the most productive firms engage in Foreign Direct Investments, while 
less  productive  firms  choose  international  outsourcing  and  domestic  firms  vertically 
integrate at home.  
Empirical support to the theoretical prediction of Antras and Helpman models come from 
several  studies,  such  as:  Tomiura  (2005  and  2007);  Anderson  et  al.;  (2008);  Federico 
(2009); Kohler and Smolka (2009).    6 
In such analyses (both theoretical and empirical), the missing element is the “other side of 
the coin”, the complementary agent of the global operation, i.e. the firm that produces as 
supplier to other firms rather than as manufacturer of the final product. Here we come to 
the other stream of the literature that has analyzed organization and performance of 
firms involved in GVCs, paying more attention to the role and the upgrading processes of 
supplier firms.  
This stream of literature was initiated by Gereffi (1994) and subsequently enhanced by 
contributions of Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994), Gereffi (1999), Henderson et al. (2002) 
and  Humphrey  and  Schmitz  (2002).  Most  applications  are  based  on  clusters  of  firms 
operating in developing countries, that join the GVCs has a partial substitute for full home 
based industrialization processes, following a new path for industrialization. Differently 
from  the  empirical  studies  before  reviewed, most  empirical  analyses,  based  upon  the 
Global Value Chain Approach predictions, are made of descriptive case-studies, rather 
than based on econometric investigations of representative samples.
1  
The distinctive feature of the Global Value Chain Approach, relevant to our investigation, 
is essentially how participation in GVCs may affect the performance of an intermediate 
firm, thus enhancing the probability “to move up” the value chain. In particular, scholars 
focus on factors contributing to the improved firm performance or “upgrading” of firms in 
the  GVCs.  At  least  four  distinct  channels  of  upgrading  are  envisioned:  (a)  product 
innovation (increasing the ability of supplier firms to satisfy higher value added, more 
sophisticated products – Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Bair and Gereffi, 2001; Bazan and 
Navas-Aleman,  2004;  Giuliani  et  al.,  2005  –  or  enlarging  product  lines);  (b)  process 
innovation (increasing the technical efficiency of the production process); (c) functional 
upgrading (improving the quality of supplier’s operations along the GVCs, or moving to 
higher quality functions, e.g., from production to design); and (d) inter-chain upgrading 
                                                              
1 The absence of good quality firm level data (Sturgeon and Gereffi, 2009) may explain why most of such 
empirical analyses have been based on detailed case-studies, surveys and anecdotal evidence rather than on 
statistical investigations.   7 
(applying the competence acquired in a particular function so as to move into a new 
chain). 
Thus,  according  to  the  Global  Value  Chain  Approach,  firms’  technical  and  relational 
abilities can be determinants of suppliers’ performance. In particular, the propensity to 
penetrate foreign markets, on the one hand, and the ability to introduce process and 
product innovations, on the other, are often viewed as important determinants of a firm’s 
ability to exploit the opportunities offered by participation in GVCs.  
The predictions of the Global Value Chain Approach have been tested in recent articles 
(Accetturo et al. 2011; Accetturo et al., 2012; Giunta et al., 2012) for the case of Italian 
industrial  supplier  firms.  All  found  that,  to  some  extent,  suppliers  able  to  penetrate 
foreign markets and to carry out innovation (organizational, product and process) exhibit 
labour  productivity  performance  similar  to  final  firms,  whereas  “traditional”  (i.e.  non-
exporting and non-innovating) suppliers have lower productivity than final firms.
2 
 
2.2 Italian and German firms in the GVCs 
From  a  static  point  of  view,  Germany  and  Italy  are  similar  under  many  respects. 
Manufacturing is prominent in both countries: in 2010, in Germany equals to 25,3% of 
total value added and in Italy 23,3% (Eurostat,  XX). The production structure is quite 
similar: family-owned German firms represent 90% of total firms, 86% in Italy (Bugamelli 
et  al.,  2012).  Foreign  markets  penetration  of  manufacturing  products  is  high  in  both 
countries: share of exports to German GDP is 39.9%, in Italy 23.4%.  A starker difference is, 
instead, represented by the size of the firms: the average number of employees in Italian 
firms was 9 in 2009, while in Germany was 37. 
Both countries share a great involvement in GVCs. Largely as outward processing trade, 
the global operation of firms started quite early in Germany (Helg and Tajoli, 2005) and 
accelerated  around  the  1990’s,  after  the  unification  process,  with  the  increasing 
                                                              
2 On the contrary, Kimura (2002), for Japanese firms, and Razzolini and Vannoni (2011) for Italian ones, 
investigating the relative performance of suppliers, have documented a profitability and productivity gap in 
which suppliers are disadvantaged relative to other producers.   8 
commercial  integration  with  Poland,  Slovakia,  Czech  Republic,  and  Hungary.  Foreign 
outsourcing started somewhat later in Italy (in the second half of the ‘90s) as a firms’ 
reaction strategy to shocks such as stronger competitive pressure from Eastern European 
and  Asian  producers;  exchange  rate  constraints  before  the  introduction  of  the  single 
European currency; and the development and spread of ICTs.  
As underlined by Breda and Cappariello (2012), if the direct and indirect import content of 
the production of goods and services is taken as an indicator of international outsourcing, 
we will appreciate another similarity between the two countries. In 2007, such indicator 
was around 17% for both the Italian and the German economies: “on this basis and from a 
static  viewpoint,  also  Italy  could  be  defined  as  a  «bazaar  economy»”
3  (Breda  and 
Cappariello, 2012, 133). 
 
 
2.3  Firms in GVCs, facing the great recession 
“World trade experienced a sudden, severe, and synchronized collapse in late 2008 – the 
sharpest in recorded history and deepest since WWII” (Baldwin, 2009). World trade in 
manufactures fell by about 30% between the first half of 2008 and the first half of 2009 
(WTO, 2009). The fall in trade during the crisis has also been quite homogeneous across all 
countries: more than 90% of OECD countries have exhibited simultaneously a decline in 
exports and imports exceeding 10% (Martins and Araújo, 2009). 
According  to  the  recent  work  of  several  researchers,
4  GVCs  had  a  leading  role in  the 
transmission of the shocks in the 2008-09 crisis, causing the Great Trade Collapse. Why 
were GCVs regarded as the main propagation of the global downturn? Which were the 
transmission mechanisms? The main idea is that because of the vertical specialization and 
links among firms, reduction of the final demand will be amplified more than it would be 
implied by the “standard trade channel” (Bems et al., 2010). In Yi (2009) this will happen 
                                                              
3 The label “bazaar economy” comes from Sinn (2003), suggesting that Germany sells products that were not 
produced in the country. 
4 For a lively debate on these issues see also Voxeu http://www.voxeu.org/   9 
because  the  same  component  might  be  exchanged several  times  (and  crosses several 
national borders) before it is finally incorporated in the final product.  
Alessandria  et  al.  (2011)  test  another  likely  channel  of  transmission  based  on  the 
inventory adjustments firms adopt to face the demand reduction. As a consequence of a 
reduction in the final demand, final firms decreased orders across GVCs firms. On the 
other hand, Escaith et al. (2010) agree only partially on the role played by the “inventory 
effect”.  
In  the  same  spirit,  but  pursuing  a  somewhat  different  line  of  analysis, is  the work  of 
Altomonte et al. (2012). The latter do recognize that magnitude of the drop is caused by 
the exceptionally negative growth rates of both intermediates and capital goods, which 
are originated by the emergence of GVCs. The novelty of their approach concerns the 
introduction of the peculiar modes of organization of inter-firm linkages as a key factor to 
explain firms’ different resilience during the crisis, for both imports and exports. In their 
analyses,  based  on  a  representative  sample  of  French  firms,  they  single  out  two 
organizational modes: the first one pursued by multinational firms that entail trade among 
related parties; while, according to the second one, the relationship between buyer and 
supplier is carried out by arm’s length trade. They  found that trade originated within 
hierarchies of firms (i.e. transactions among firms belonging to a group) reacted faster to 
the negative demand shock but also recovered faster in the following months than arm’s 
length trade: “our explanatory hypothesis is that the internalization of activities within the 
boundary of a group allows for a better management of information flows coming from 
the bottom of the value chain so that production and inventories can be more swiftly 
adjusted to demand shocks” (Altomonte et al., 2012, 22). 
Békés et al. (2011) shed some more light on the link between GVCs and different impacts 
they had on firms, highlighting that firm’s positioning in GVCs do matter. On the basis of a 
survey  over  14,000  manufacturing  firms  operating  in  Europe:  Germany,  France,  Italy,   10 
Spain, Austria, Hungary, and the UK, they show that in 2009 outsourcers registered 1.8 
percentage points smaller reduction in sales, while suppliers’ sale contracted more.  
 
3.  Data 
For the comparative analysis of firms in the GVCs between Germany and Italy we use the 
Efige survey. The data have been collected within the EFIGE project – European firms in a 
global  economy:  internal  policies  for  external  competitiveness  –  supported  by  the 
Research Directorate General of the European Commission. The sample includes around 
3,000 firms for France, Germany, Italy and Spain, more than 2,200 firms for UK, and 500 
firms for Austria and Hungary. 
Sampling  design  follows  a  stratification  by  sector  and  firm  size,  that  induces  an 
oversampling  for  large  firms.  The  sample is  representative  for  the  local  population  of 
firms, as shown by Barba Navaretti et al. (2011). 
The  survey  questionnaire  contains  both  qualitative  and  quantitative  data  on  firms’ 
characteristics  and  activities,  split  into  six  sections  providing  different  pieces  of 
information on: structure of the firm; workforce; investment; technological innovation and 
R&D; internationalisation; finance; market and pricing.
5 Data from the survey was then 
matched with balance sheet information from Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk).
6   
As this paper focuses on the two major industrial economies of the Euro area, we make 
use of the Italian and German firm data. This should leave us with slightly less than 6,000 
observations. However, the number of firms actually used in the analysis is much lower 
(slightly more than 3,000: 2,000 for Italy and 1,000 for Germany) due to the presence of 
several missing values in the balance sheet data. 
Descriptive statistics are reported in table 1.  
                                                              
5 The questionnaire can be found at the website www.efige.org  
6 We consider all the manufacturing firms, food and beverages excluded, due to the countercyclical 
nature of these industries.   11 
We use the share of total turnover made up by sales of produced-to-order goods to other 
firms  (Share  of  produced-to-order,  SPTO  henceforth)  as  a  proxy  for  the  sales  of  an 
intermediate  firm  in  a  GVC.  Indeed,  produced-to-order  strategies  allow  customers  to 
purchase products that are specific to their needs. This is likely to approximate in the best 
way the strict relationships that are usually established in a GVC. The higher this share, the 
more “intermediate” a firm, i.e. the lower its access to final consumers. 
Table 1 shows that SPTO is quite large. On average, more than three-fourth of a firm’s 
sales is made up of selling of intermediate goods to other firms. The standard deviation is 
also  quite  high  and  it  hints  at  the  existence  of  a  “polarized”  world  in  which  fully 
intermediate firms coexist with final ones.
7  
 
4.  Descriptive analysis  
 
4.1 Participation to GVCs and performance  
Table 2 reports the average SPTO for Italy and Germany by sector, and, for comparison, 
the share purchases over sales. There is a stark difference between the two countries. 
Italian SPTO is on average 18 percentage points higher than the German one, and it is 
larger for all sectors. Purchases of Italian firms also seem quite high compared with the 
German one, thus indicating a lower value added in the production process. All in all 
,Italian firms seem more intermediate and fragmented than the German ones. 
Italian firms’ fragmentation is confirmed by fig. 1 that depicts the evolution between 2001 
and  2008  of  the  median  Vertical  Integration  Index.  The  Vertical  Integration  Index  is 
computed as the ratio between value added and sales and it proxies the share of turnover 
internally produced by the firm. The higher the share, the more vertically integrated the 
firm. The line for Germany (solid red) is always above the one for Italy (blue dashed). This 
confirms the larger fragmentation of Italian firms in comparison with the German ones. 
                                                              
7 As the average number of employees is 48, the Efige dataset is, as already mentioned, representative of medium and 
large firms.   12 
However, the fact that the trend over time is decreasing for Germany also confirms the 
transformation of that economy into a “Bazaar economy” (Sinn, 2003).  
Italy’s prevalence of intermediate firms is also proved by table 3. In this table we define 
“intermediate” a firms with a SPTO equal to 100 per cent. Almost two-thirds of Italian 
firms  can  be  defined  as  intermediate  whereas  this  share  is  equal  to  42  per  cent  in 
Germany. As in table 2, the pervasiveness of intermediate firms is confirmed in all sectors.  
Table  4  reports  some  descriptive  statistics  of  firms’  characteristics  and  performance. 
Intermediate firms in the dataset are smaller in terms of both sales and employment and 
less productive. In the period 2008-09, they also accumulated a larger decrease in total 
sales compared with final companies. 
These differences are also confirmed within each country, as the ranking between final 
and intermediate firms is preserved. The cross-country comparison also highlights the 
weaknesses of the Italian productive structure and its disappointing performance in the 
crisis  period.  The  gap  is  particularly  wide  in  terms  of  employees  while  the  labour 
productivity discount for Italian firms is larger for final firms. In our dataset the differential 
in the 2008-09 performance is also huge.
8  
 
4.2 Detecting heterogeneity  
So far, the Efige dataset has confirmed a well-known fact: intermediate firms are usually 
“worse”  than  the  final  ones  under  many  aspects  ranging  from  size  to  productivity; 
moreover, during the recent crisis, they also experienced a more dramatic fall in sales. 
However, a recent stream of literature has highlighted the heterogeneous nature of both 
suppliers and final firms. Companies tend to differ from each other in terms of strategic 
choices to compete in the markets. 
                                                              
8 According to Eurostat, Industry and Trade Statistics, between 2007 and 2009, industrial 
production fell by 22.2 per cent in Italy and 16.9 per cent in Germany. This hints that the Efige 
dataset for Germany is skewed toward more successful firms.   13 
In order to deduce the adopted strategies, we start by analyzing firm’s choices in terms of 
innovation,  internationalization  and  human  capital  accumulation.  As  most  of  these 
variables are generally highly correlated,
9 we resort to the principal component analysis; 
The primary purpose of this technique is the reduction of a set of correlated covariates in 
some latent variables (feature reduction).  
We consider the following variables: 
-  share of employees with a university degree; 
-  share of employees in training activities; 
-  dummy for the introduction of product innovation; 
-  dummy for the introduction of process innovation; 
-  exports share over total turnover. 
Our components of interest are those with the eigenvalue greater than one.  
Table 5 reports the factor loadings for the first two components. 
The first component, that we call Innovation&Trade, is highly correlated with the actions 
aimed at strengthening the innovative potential (process and product innovation) and the 
access to foreign markets (share of exports); in other words, it denotes firms that expand 
the range of products and the number of served markets. 
The second  component, Human capital, is instead highly correlated with the share of 
employees  with  a  university  degree  and  involved  in  training  activities.  It  denotes  a 
strategy aimed at improving the quality of their products by rising the educational levels 
of the workforce.   
Table 6 shows that intermediate firms are less involved in both Innovation&Trade and 
Human Capital strategies. By analyzing these characteristics according to the country of 
localization, interesting patters emerge.  
                                                              
9 The relationship between skill intensity, trade and innovation is well established in the empirical 
literature. See Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Griliches (2000).   14 
The Innovation&Trade strategy in Italian and German firms is not particularly different 
within  each  group.  For  each  type  of  firms,  the  point  estimate  in  one  country  is  not 
statistically different from the one in the other. In other words, although in each nation 
the ranking between final and intermediate firm is preserved, the behaviour of each kind 
of company is not statistically different from one country to the other. 
The  picture  is  totally  different  when  we  look  at  the  Human  Capital  strategy.  This  is 
definitely more widespread in Germany than in Italy, although, even in this  case,  the 
ranking between final and intermediate is confirmed within each country. 
 
5.  Performance during the crisis  
We now look at the relationship between firm performance and its positioning in GVCs 
and strategy. To do so, we estimate the following equation: 
 
(1)  i c s i i i i i i D D X Strat SPTO Strat SPTO y e f f g b b b a + + + + + + + = D 2 1 3 2 1 *  
 
Where  i y D  is the cumulated growth rate of sales between 2007 and 2009 for firm i. 
i SPTO  is its share of produced-to-order sales.  i Strat  is a set of dummies of the firm’s 
chosen  strategy  that  emerges  from  the  principal  component  analysis.  i X   is  a  set  of 
covariates aimed at capturing firms’ heterogeneity; it includes a control for the initial (log) 
level of sales and the number of employees both measured in 2007.   s D  and  c D  are sets 
of, respectively, sector and country dummies.  
The coefficients of interest are  1 b ,  2 b  and  3 b .  1 b  capture the correlation between the 
performance during the crisis and the firm’s positioning in the GVC.  2 b  indicates the 
influence of firms’ strategies on the dynamics of sales in the period 2008-09.  3 b  denotes 
the possible heterogeneous effects of those strategies according to the firm’s position in 
the GVC.   15 
Equation (1) is estimated by OLS, standard errors are robust to take into account  the 
heteroskedasticity concerns. We also exclude from the regressions the first and the 99
th 
percentile of the dependent variable to minimize the impact of outliers. As pointed out in 
the introduction, coefficients  1 b ,  2 b  and  3 b  cannot be interpreted in causal way but, 
rather,  as  conditioned  statistical  associations.  This  is  due  to  the  presence  of  serious 
endogeneity  problems:  there  can  be  a  number  of  omitted  variables  (such  as  firm’s 
productivity, entrepreneur’s ability.) that affect both the firm’s decisions (intermediate vs. 
final or its strategies) and its performance during a period of crisis. Unfortunately, this 
problem cannot be easily solved; there are not obvious instruments that correlate with 
companies’ choices but not with its performance. For this reason, we should consider the 
estimates of equation (1) as multivariate stylized facts on the microeconomics of GVCs.  
Results are shown in table 7. 
Column (1) reports a simple specification with just the SPTO variable and country and 
sector dummies. The coefficient of SPTO is negative and significant, thus confirming that 
being intermediate is associated with a negative performance during the crisis. The effect 
is quite small but persistent over specifications. A standard deviation increase in the SPTO 
(37.7 points) is associated to an additional fall in sales by 1.3 percentage points, that 
amounts to the 6 per cent of the average decline in turnover during the crisis (-21.9 per 
cent) (table 1 reports the values of the standard deviations). 
Column (2)  adds  firm-level  controls  such  as  the initial  period  (log) levels  of  sales  and 
employment. The coefficient for 2007 turnover is negative and significant thus showing a 
process of mean reversion. Larger firms (measured in employment) attenuated instead 
the fall in sales during the crisis. The SPTO coefficient is still negative and significant, with 
a point estimate quite close to the previous regression. 
In column (3) we insert controls for firm strategies. Both Innovation&Trade and Human 
Capital are positive and significant. This implies that, controlling for sector, country, firms’   16 
characteristics  and  positioning  in  the  GVC,  the  adoption  of  one  of  those  strategies 
attenuates the negative effect of the crisis. In particular, a rise by standard deviation (1.0) 
of the Human Capital indicator increases the growth of sales by 2.2 percentage points; the 
same  expansion  for  the  Innovation&Trade  index  determines  a  rise  by  0.9  percentage 
points. The smaller effect for the Innovation&Trade component can be rationalized by the 
“Trade” component of this indicator; as the crisis was originally trade-induced, exporting 
firms were more exposed to the severe drop in international demand, thus attenuating 
the possible positive effects of such strategy.  
In column (4) we investigate the hypothesis that firm strategies can have different effects 
according to the positioning in the GVC. This is done by interacting Innovation&Trade and 
Human Capital variables with SPTO. Results show that while the Human Capital coefficient 
is still positive and significant, its interaction with SPTO is not statistically different from 
zero;  this  implies  that  this  strategy  has  the  same  positive  effect  on  both  final  and 
intermediate firms. 
The positive average effect of the Innovation&Trade strategy (column 3) hides instead a 
huge heterogeneity between final and intermediate firms as the latter benefit much more 
from this strategy than the former.  
Before interpreting this result, it is interesting to understand the real magnitudes of these 
coefficients  by  some  back-of-the-envelope  calculations.  Consider  a  representative  firm 
with sales and employment equal to the mean and belonging to the textile industry; if its 
SPTO  is  equal  to  zero  (a  final  firm)  and  its  Innovation&Trade  indicator  is  at  the  25
th 
percentile of the distribution (-0.925), its expected growth in the crisis period is 2.0 per 
cent;  if  the  same  firm  were  at  the  75
th  percentile  of  the  Innovation&Trade  index  its 
expected growth would be negative (-2.1 per cent). Consider now the same exercise for a 
fully intermediate firm (SPTO=100) with the same characteristics. The expected growth if   17 
Innovation&Trade indicator is at the 25
th percentile is -5.4 per cent; the one for a firm at 
the 75
th percentile is -2.0 per cent.   
This suggests that an Innovation&Trade strategy attenuates, for the intermediate firms, 
the negative effects of being exposed to a major international demand contraction. This 
can  be  rationalized  by  the  fact  that  innovative  intermediate  firms  may  more  likely  
establish longer term relationships in the GVCs, due to the higher quality of their products.  
 
 
5.1 Do GVCs explain the Italy-Germany performance gap?  
We finally analyze whether the positioning within a GVC and the firm strategies may help 
to explain the Italy-Germany performance gap. As clearly shown in table 4, during the 
2008-09 crisis Italian and German firms in the Efige dataset presented divergent dynamics 
in terms of sales.  
The Italian structural problems are well known (see Brandolini and Bugamelli, 2009, for a 
comprehensive review) and they range from the small size of the firms to backward labour 
market institutions and include inefficiencies of public administration as well as rigidities 
in the service markets. 
In the descriptive statistics of the paper, we have also shown how Italian industry  is 
characterized  by  a very  large  number  of  fully intermediate  firms  that  performed  very 
badly during the crisis. 
In this section, we try to understand whether the high number of intermediate firms in 
Italy did contributed to this relevant performance gap. To do so, fig. 2 reports the absolute 
value of the dummy Italy across several specifications. As the dummy is always negative, 
the higher the bar, the worse the performance of Italian firms. 
The first bar (No controls) is the simple difference in mean between Italian and German 
firms’ sales in the period 2008-09, that is quite huge (22.5 percentage points).    18 
In the second bar (Sectors), we report the modulus of the dummy Italy when we add 
controls for industries. This is aimed at taking into account composition effects due to the 
different sectoral specializations. The dummy Italy is basically unchanged, thus confirming 
that the Italian structural problems are only weakly related to the industry composition. 
In the third bar (firm characteristics), we add covariates at firm level (initial employment 
and sales) in order to capture microeconomic differences in terms of size and productivity. 
In this case, the dummy Italy registers a drop; this implies that the Italian endowment of 
small and less productive firms had a negative effect on the average national performance 
during the crisis. 
In the fourth and the fifth bars we include controls for, respectively, position in the GVC 
(SPTO) and strategies interacted with SPTO. In both cases, the bars register a fall thus 
confirming that the position in GVCs and firms’ choices have a relevant role in shaping a 
country’s performance. 
The  comparison  between  columns  (3)  and  (5)  shows  that  GVCs  and  firms’  strategies 
accounted for 2.2 percentage points. As the overall difference in performance is 22.5 
percentage points, this implies that these features account for almost 10 per cent of the 
total difference between German and Italian firms. This is not a small number, considering 
that this kind of explanation of the Italy-Germany gap has been overlooked by analysts 
and policy makers.  
 
6.  Concluding remarks  
According to recent papers (Alessandria et al., 2011; Altomonte et al., 2012; Baldwin, 
2009; Bekes et al., 2011, Bems et al., 2010; Yi ,2009), GVCs have been one of the main 
transmission mechanisms of the Great Trade Collapse that severely and simultaneously hit 
all OECD countries in 2009, thus amplifying the national fluctuations of demand for final 
goods.    19 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this recent debate by looking at the impact of the 
crisis on firms’ performance. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the few papers 
that investigates the micro impact of the crisis on firms involved in GVCs. 
Our research hypothesis is that firms’ positioning along the GVCs – whether intermediate 
or final firms - as well as some firms’ strategies –to increase the level of human capital; 
innovation propensity and foreign markets penetration- play a significant role in their 
performance in 2008-09.  We compare German and Italian industrial firms; these two 
countries  provide  to  be  an  interesting  area  of  application  as:  i)  they  are  both  highly 
industrialized countries and leaders in Europe manufacturing exports; ii) industrial firms of 
both countries are substantially involved in and affected by globalization; iii) a large share 
of firms (higher in the Italian industry) work exclusively as intermediate firms , a key factor 
in our analyses to explain heterogeneous resilience to the crisis. 
In our analyses we use the Efige dataset, a unique database that contains both qualitative 
and quantitative data on firms’ characteristics and activities; the data have been matched 
with balance sheet information from Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk).  
Our descriptive analysis shows that, within each country, intermediate firms are smaller 
than final ones (in terms of both sales and employment) and less productive. In the 2008-
09 period, they also accumulated a larger decrease in total sales compared with final 
companies. As shown by Altomonte et al. (2012), the result is somewhat expected as the 
impacts of a shock on final demand are amplified for firms participating in GVCs which are 
located further from the final customer:  “when global demand fell towards the end of 
2008 – in parallel with heightened financial uncertainty – upstream firms were able to 
satisfy lower demand mostly by drawing from the large inventories they were holding. 
This however caused orders across global value chains to decrease substantially and more 
than proportionally with respect to the initial downstream drop in demand, but in line 
with lower future expectations” (Altomonte et al., 2012)   20 
The  cross-country  analysis  shows  that,  in  comparison  with  German  firms,  a  higher 
percentage  of  Italian  industrial  firms  are  fully  intermediate  (they  sell  100%  of  their 
turnover to other firms); moreover, the differential in performance in 2008-09 is quite 
remarkable, as the Italian intermediate firms decreased their turnover by 30% versus a 7% 
fall of sales of German intermediate firms.  
The aggregate figures may mask firms’ heterogeneous resilience to the crisis. In order to 
dissect  such  heterogeneity,  we  carry  out  a  principal  component  analysis,  that 
distinguishes  among  two  main  firms’  strategies,  respectively  labeled  “Innovation  and 
Trade”  and  “Human  Capital”.  The  results  shed  some  more  light  on  the  differences 
between  Italian  and  German  firms,  the  latter  being  significantly  more  involved  in  a 
strategy aimed at raising the educational levels and training of the workforce. 
The main results of our regressions confirm the findings of the descriptive analysis: being 
an intermediate firm is generally associated with a more severe contraction of sales during 
the  2008-09  crisis.  However,  heterogeneity  among  firms  matters.  The  contraction  of 
turnover for final firms with previously pursued a strategy of increasing the human capital 
level was smaller; on the other hand, innovative intermediate firms also experienced a 
slighter reduction of turnover. Finally, the cross-country comparison shows how the well-
known weaknesses of the Italian industry in terms of average firms’ size and strategies 
severely undermine a successful participation in the GVCs, thus casting a shadow over 
Italy’s  role  in  the  current  and  future  international  division  of  labour  as  Italy  risks  to 
become  a “factory country”, to use Baldwin (2011) taxonomy. On the contrary, the higher 
share  of  final  firms,  the  larger  firms’  size,  the  higher  firms’  labour  productivity  partly 
explain German firms’ capacity to face the crisis and to fastly recover.  
While some limitations in the methodology of this paper have to be addressed in our 
future research agenda, the correlation we found between firms’ positioning in the GVCs,   21 
their strategy and the ability to face the crisis have relevant implications, that seem, so 
far, overlooked by policy makers.  
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Table 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  
No. Obs.  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
SPTO  3,253  75.6  37.7 
Share of purchases over 
sales  3,224  29.2  24.7 
Sales in 2007 (1)  3,253  11,364  97,889 
Employees in 2007  3,253  48.5  179.6 
Labour productivity in 
2007 (2)  2,394  53.2  48.9 
Percentage change of 
sales 2008-09  3,253  -21.9  34.7 
       
Source: Authors’ calculations on Efige dataset.  
Weighted averages according to the sample design.   
(1) Thousands of euros. (2) Value added (in thousands of euros) per employee. 
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Table 2 
ITALIAN AND GERMAN FIRMS IN GVC 
  
Italy  Germany 
 
Share of 
produced to 
order sales 
Share of 
purchases over 
sales 
Share of 
produced to 
order sales 
Share of 
purchases over 
sales 
Traditional  82.1  32.3  53.8  17.7 
Chemical  76.9  38.0  65.6  17.0 
Metals  84.7  34.1  69.5  16.9 
Mechanics  81.1  33.5  62.7  21.7 
Advanced mechanics  70.3  29.9  50.9  19.5 
Automotive  78.9  36.8  60.8  22.1 
Other  78.2  33.2  62.2  15.9 
Total  80.9  33.7  62.9  18.2 
         
Source: Authors’ calculations on Efige dataset.  
Weighted averages according to the sample design.   
Traditional sectors include: Manufacture of textiles, leather and furniture; Chemical includes: Manufacture of chemical products, 
rubber and plastic products; Metals includes: Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment; Mechanics includes: Manufacture of machinery, equipment, office machinery, computers and electrical machinery; 
Advanced Mechanics includes: Manufacture of radio, television, communication equipment, medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks; Automotive includes: Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers semi-trailers and other transport 
equipment. Other includes: Manufacture of wood and wood products, pulp, paper and paper products, publishing and printing, 
coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel and Recycling. 
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Table 3 
INTERMEDIATE AND FINAL FIRMS IN ITALY AND GERMANY 
  
Italy  Germany 
 
Total number of 
firms 
% of 
intermediate 
Total number of 
firms 
% of 
intermediate 
Traditional  487  69.4  94  31.1 
Chemical  229  59.9  127  40.7 
Metals  557  70.3  250  50.0 
Mechanics  427  60.0  243  43.5 
Advanced mechanics  92  51.4  95  32.1 
Automotive  52  55.6  18  35.1 
Other  358  63.4  204  37.3 
Total  2222  65.1  1031  41.6 
         
Source: Authors’ calculations on Efige dataset.  
Weighted averages according to the sample design.  Firms are defined “intermediate” if their share of produced-to-order sales is 
equal to 100%. 
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Table 4 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIRMS 
  
Intermediate  Final 
Sales in 2007 (1)  8,251  15,708 
Employees in 2007  41.1  58.9 
Labour productivity in 
2007 (2)  50.4  58.0 
Percentage change of 
sales 2008-09  -25.4  -17.0 
  Italy  Germany 
  Intermediate (3)  Final  Total  Intermediate (3)  Final  Total 
Sales in 2007 (1)  8,005  14,798  10,377  9,191  17,038  13,777 
Employees in 2007  35.6  43.6  38.3  62.4  81.4  73.5 
Labour productivity in 
2007 (2)  50.2  52.9  51.1  56.6  99.5  82.1 
Percentage change of 
sales 2008-09  -30.2  -25.3  -28.4  -7.5  -4.9  -5.9 
             
Source: Authors’ calculations on Efige dataset.  
Weighted averages according to the sample design.  (1) Thousands of euros. (2) Value added (in thousands of euros) per employee. (3) Firms are defined “intermediate” if 
their share of produced-to-order sales is equal to 100%. 
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Table 5 
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
  
Component 1  
Innovation&Trade 
Component 2 
Human Capital 
     
Share w/ university degree  0.402  0.420 
Share in training  0.246  0.733 
Product innovation  0.627  -0.212 
Process innovation  0.370  0.065 
Export share   0.495  -0.486 
     
Eigenvalues  1.442  1.103 
Source: Authors’ calculations on Efige dataset.  
Weighted averages according to the sample design.  Innovation&Trade and Human Capital are the 
first two components of a Principal Component Analysis including: (i) share of employees with a 
university degree, (ii) share of employees in training activities, (iii) a dummy for the introduction of 
product innovation, (iv) a dummy for the introduction of process innovation, (v) export share over 
total sales. The first two components have all the eigenvalue larger than one and explain half of 
total variability. Innovation&Trade is highly correlated with variables (iii), (iv) and (v); Human 
Capital is highly correlated with (i) and (ii). 
 
 
 
Table 6 
HETEROGENEITY ACROSS FIRMS 
  
Intermediate  Final 
Innovation&Trade  -0.083  0.116 
Human Capital   -0.073  0.103 
  Italy  Germany 
  Intermediate  Final  Total  Intermediate  Final  Total 
Innovation&Trade  -0.075  0.133  -0.002  -0.113  0.092  0.006 
Human Capital   -0.216  -0.188  -0.206  0.471  0.529  0.505 
             
Source: Authors’ calculations on Efige dataset.  
Weighted averages according to the sample design.  Innovation&Trade and Human Capital are the first two components of a Principal Component Analysis including: (i) 
share of employees with a university degree, (ii) share of employees in training activities, (iii) a dummy for the introduction of product innovation, (iv) a dummy for the 
introduction of process innovation, (v) export share over total sales. The first two components have all the eigenvalue larger than one and explain half of total variability. 
Innovation&Trade is highly correlated with variables (iii), (iv) and (v); Human Capital is highly correlated with (i) and (ii). 
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Table 7 
FIRMS PERFORMANCE IN 2008-09 
  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Share of produced-to-order 
sales (SPTO) 
-0.034** 
(0.016) 
-0.038** 
(0.016) 
-0.035** 
(0.016) 
-0.036** 
(0.016) 
Log(employment)-2007  -  3.504** 
(1.421) 
3.449** 
(1.420) 
3.477** 
(1.417) 
Log(sales)-2007  -  -4.074*** 
(1.104) 
-4.245*** 
(1.165) 
-4.170*** 
(1.162) 
Innovation&Trade  -  -  0.923* 
(0.564) 
-2.282**  
(0.996) 
Human Capital   -  -  2.205*** 
(0.601) 
3.555** 
(1.124) 
Innovation&Trade*SPTO  -  -  -  0.042** 
(0.012) 
Human Capital*SPTO   -  -  -  -0.016 
(0.014) 
No. industry dummies  20  20  20  20 
Country dummy: Italy  -21.776*** 
(1.178) 
-20.328*** 
(1.309) 
-19.072*** 
(1.346) 
-18.894*** 
(1.340) 
Constant  -2.593 
(2.726) 
18.619  
(6.142) 
20.075** 
(6.563) 
19.307** 
(6.570) 
         
R^2  0.13  0.14  0.15  0.15 
No. Obs.  3,253  3,253  3,253  3,253 
         
Source: Authors’ calculations on Efige dataset.  
OLS weighted estimates according to sample design. Dependent variable: percentage change in sales in the period 2008-09. All estimates exclude 
the 1st and the 99th percentile of the dependent variable. White-robust standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, 
***  significant at 1%. 
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Fig. 1 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION INDEX 
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Source: Authors’ calculations on the Efige dataset. 
Evolution  over  time  of  the  weighted  median  Vertical  Integration  Index  (VII).  VII  is  computed  as  the 
percentage of value added over total sales. 
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Fig. 2 
DO GVC MATTER FOR 2008-09 COUNTRY PERFORMANCE? 
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
No controls (1) Sectors (2) + firm
characteristics (3)
+ position in the
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Source: Authors’ calculations on the Efige dataset. 
The figure shows the value of  the “Dummy  Italy” (in absolute value).  The higher the bar, the more 
negative  the  average  performance  for  Italian  firms  during  the  crisis.  No  controls  is  a  simple  mean 
difference between Germany and Italy.  Sectors shows the “Dummy Italy” controlling for 20 industry 
dummies. + firm characteristics inserts controls for the log level of sales and employment in 2007. + 
position in the GVC adds controls for the share of produced-to-order sales. + strategies adds controls for 
firms’ strategies and their interaction with the share of produced to order sales. 
 
 
 